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Religious change in a minority context: Transforming Islam in Sri 
Lanka 
Scholarly work exists on how Muslim minority positioning affects identity and 
politics, but what is less known is its impact on religion. Sri Lanka’s nine percent 
Muslim population, the country’s second largest minority, has undergone a series 
of recent changes to religious identity, thinking and practice, which have been 
shaped by its relationship to the dominant and warring ‘ethnic others.’ As Sri 
Lanka plunged deeper into armed conflict in the 1990s, Muslims experienced 
significant shifts in religious thinking and practice, identifying strictly with a 
more ‘authentic’ Islam. After the war ended in 2009, Muslims became the target 
of majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist violence, resulting in a re-interpretation of 
Islam and a counter process of change. Using the Sri Lankan Muslim case study 
to engage with scholarly critiques of majority-minority binaries, this article 
analyses how religious change is brought about through the interjection of 
minority status with ethno-nationalisms and conflict. Its focus on Islam in Sri 
Lanka contributes to area studies and to Islamic studies, the latter through a rare 
analysis of Islamic reform in a Muslim minority context. 
Keywords: Islamic reform, Muslim minorities, Sri Lanka, conflict, ethno-




How a group’s numerically diminutive and/or non-dominant status produces different 
forms of identity is more often explored in scholarly work than the effect of these on 
religious thinking and practice. This article analyses how Muslim identity and religion 
in a minority context is reproduced through a prism, constituting their specific minority 
positioning in relation to the dominant other. Using my case study of Muslims in Sri 
Lanka, I explore how their specific minority positioning influenced not only their 
politics and identity, but also religious thinking, norms and practices and their religious 
interpretations of the ‘other’.i  
Part of the change discussed in this article was a process of Islamic reform, at times 
described by some groups as ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘extremist.’ This article also 
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interrogates how Islamic reform occurs in a Muslim minority context, a subject which 
remains much under-researched. Islamic reform is very often conceptualised in Muslim 
majority situations or in Islamic states presenting problematic definitions, tainted with 
generalisations, exceptionalism and essentialism.ii The exceptions from anthropology 
can be too microcosmic, from politics and international relations too generalised, or 
‘western’ centric from north America or Europe, and lastly can be consumed by 
securitisation or rights based discourses. I argue that where Muslims are a minority 
group, their distinct minority positioning is fundamental to both the reproduction of 
religion and to Islamic reform processes. 
 
Categories of ‘majority’ and ‘minority,’ in addition to being colonial constructs, are 
problematic for a number of reasons including their potential to include and exclude.iii 
Developing on the work of Saba Mahmood, I argue that modern states in conflation 
with nationalism, religion and ethnicity, produce and reproduce ‘minority’ ‘majority’ 
categories and this article analyses how religion and identity in the case of Muslims, 
responds to this.  
 
Sri Lankan Muslims hold the ‘precarious’ position of being the country’s ‘second 
minority,’ frequently caught between the power struggles of the majority Sinhalese 
Buddhists and the larger minority Tamils.iv Amounting to 9.3 percent of the population 
and speaking both Sinhalese and Tamil they should be a power block themselves, but 
spread across the country, their political, economic and social profile is heterogeneous.v  
 
Ethnicity rather than religion was the defining factor in Sri Lanka’s three decade long 
armed conflict. After gaining independence from the British in 1948, the Sinhalese 
political elite indulged in majoritarian nationalistic state building leading to Tamils’ 
demand for self-determination. Successive repressive policies against minorities, 
including making Sinhala the country’s official language and giving constitutional 
superiority to Buddhism, conjoined with repetitive incidents of mob violence and 
pogroms against Tamils culminated, in the 1970s, in calls for secession by Tamil 
militant groups. Tens of thousands were killed and the country was torn apart by nearly 
three decades of civil war, which from the late 1980s was fought between the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and government forces. Despite being deemed an ethnic 
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conflict, the role of religion was unmistakable in the Buddhist state as monks from the 
majority Buddhist community sanctioned and supported critical military and 
government decisions; re-interpreting core Buddhist principles of non-violence to 
enable a ‘just war.’vi Buddhist extremist violence and political Buddhism were prevalent 
throughout the conflict, escalating in the latter years, but were generally eclipsed by the 
conflict’s ethnic preoccupation.  
 
On 19 May 2009, amidst a serious humanitarian crisis and allegations of both parties 
committing war crimes, the Sri Lankan government, with triumphalism and 
celebrations, declared the war over  having annihilated the leadership of the LTTE, .vii  
The ‘victor’s peace’ in Sri Lanka was primarily accorded to the Sinhalese and to 
Buddhism and was void of a sense of reconciliation and lacked a multi-ethnic vision.viii  
 
In the years following the end of the armed conflict, Buddhist extremist groups such as 
the Sinhala Ravaya, Ravana Balaya and the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) began to rise, 
gaining uncontested space in public with the support from some in government.  The 
country’s new found ‘peace’ was challenged as Muslims and evangelical Christians 
became targets of hate campaigns and religious attacks culminating in, at times, days of 
violence resulting in injuries and property damageix.  
 
The influence of Muslims’ minority status on their identity and politics has already been 
established in scholarly work.x My focus in this article is on religion. In the post-war 
period, in response to Buddhist violent extremism, Muslim national leaders began to 
reverse a previous process of religious change that was marked by a powerful 
Wahhabi/Salafi uprising against the established Sufi based order. From around the 
1990s, Muslim identity and Islam began to transform with Muslims identifying more 
closely with their religion, externalising it and expanding it to cover all areas of their 
life. Parallel to this was a ‘purification project,’ influenced by Wahhabi and Salafi 
ideologies, shifting religious, cultural and social practices to represent a more authentic 
Islam.xi  
 
This is the first process of change identified in this article. The second was driven by 
Muslim leaders as a consequence of violent Buddhism where identity has been 
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reconstituted in line with ethnicity and ‘Sri Lankan-ness,’ easing off on ‘purifying’ 
Islam and re-branding Islam to meet the country’s urgent demand for peace and 
reconciliation.  
 
The exception to this shockingly transpired on 21 April, 2019, when 253 people were 
killed in eight suicide bombings across Sri Lanka, for which the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) claimed responsibility, and was reportedly carried out by a little known 
group called the National Thowheed Jama’at (NTJ).xii Following the attacks the 
Jammiyathul Millathu Ibrahim (JMI) and NTJ were banned by the Sri Lankan 
government and state authorities claim that a few hundred Muslims are believed to be 
associated with these groups.xiii While these events point to a previously unforeseen 
level of violent extremism amongst Sri Lankan Muslims, I argue in this article that it is 
very much the activity of a small fringe group and not in line with the religious 
positioning of the larger community. 
 
Sri Lanka, in spite of its specificity, makes a strong case study because it enables an 
exploration of the interjection of ethnicity and nationalism with religion and minority 
positioning in a conflict situation. The two complicated processes of religious change 
this article goes onto discuss challenge theory and conceptualisation of Islamic reform 
and religious change. 
 
Historical origins and identity construction of Muslims in Sri Lanka 
 
Sri Lankan Muslims can trace their origins to Arab, West Asian and South Indian 
traders who married Indian and local women, and South East Asian Malays brought to 
work in the country by colonialists.   
 
The Portuguese (1505-1658), were responsible for the embryonic categorisation of the 
majority of Muslim traders as ‘Mouros’ and in pre-independence nationalist struggles, 
threatened by Tamil political assimilation, Muslim political elites argued for a separate 
‘Moor’ identity based on their ‘Arab origin’ and religion of Islam. Though gendered, 
exclusivist and poorly substantiated, the British accepted the argument, creating and 




Through most of their modern history; from colonisation through to independence and 
during the conflict, Muslims have adapted their identity, politics and religious 
positioning in relation to the ‘other.xv’ Persecuted and economically throttled by 
Portuguese and Dutch policies, large numbers of Muslims sought refuge in the only 
remaining Sinhala kingdom, Kandy, and ‘structurally assimilated’ including into 
Buddhist cultural and religious roles.xvi Post-independence, as Sinhala-Tamil ethno-
nationalisms strengthened and moved into conflict, Muslim political leaders swung 
between the groups, seeking the allegiance of both, though Colombo-based elites were 
most often aligned with the Sinhalese.xvii During the armed conflict many of the 
Muslims living in the north and east (almost a third of the total Muslim population) 
initially supported Tamil militancy, but were later deemed  traitors by the LTTE, partly 
because of their political support of Sinhalese in the South.xviii Consequentially, 
Muslims became victims of some of the worst LTTE atrocities. These include the 
massacre of 103 people who were observing prayers in a mosque in Kattankudy in 
August 1990, a similar attack a few days later which killed 130 people in Eravur, and 
the forcible eviction of northern Muslims in October the same year.xix 
 
The lack of understanding and indifference shown by southern Muslim politicians partly 
contributed to the formation of a Muslim political party, the Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress.xx  Though the SLMC’s formal position has been to emphasise that it is a 
‘Muslim’ party and not an Islamic one, which scholars generally agree with, its formative 
ideological positioning was undoubtedly Islamist and through occasional dabbling in 
political Islam it successfully developed a sense of communal identity throughout the 
1990s and its success in national politics gave fervour to Muslim identity and politics . xxi 
Despite the SLMC’s influence in coalition politics, no Muslim delegation was included 
in the two separate phases of peace negotiations between the government and LTTE; in 
1995and later with Norwegian facilitation in 2001-2006.xxii The side-lining of Muslims 
had particular consequences in the conflict affected areas, but across the country it 
affected their sense of national identity and inclusion which contributed to them seeking 
belongingness elsewhere and identifying with a ‘global ummah’. By the 1990s many 
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Muslims had begun to slowly isolate themselves, look inwards and focus on religion, 
leading to the first process of change identified in this article. 
 
The first phase of religious changes 
 
The first phase of change involved identifying with Islam, externalising this identity and 
attempting to live every aspect of life in accordance with Islam. This was fraught at a 
fundamental level by varying definitions of Islam. 
 
Changes to Muslim identity were best evidenced in the rapid and drastic shift in dress 
code amongst most women; from Indian influenced sari and salvar kameez to the 
Arabian one piece dress, abhaya, and the hijab, or head scarf. Islam became 
predominant in Muslim life and quickly became more institutionalised with the 
emergence of new Islamic schools, madrasas, financial and social institutions. 
Combined with this, several da’wa and Islamic educational centres were established, 
offering courses in Arabic language, history, Islamic studies, Quranic recitation and 
transliteration, and Sharia. These enabled people to identify with and learn about Islam 
whilst also embodying the religious reforms, for instance, by enforcing their own 
specific dress code or permitting only halal practice. Sharia compliance, with more 
demand for halal products, including in banking and finance, gave way to an entire 
industry ranging from food, clothing to banking products swamping the marketxxiii. 
 
This awakening to Islam was led by the three main religious movements: the Tablighi 
Jama'at,xxiv  a global transnational Islamic reform movement originating in India; the 
Jama'at-i Islami,xxv founded in India by a renowned Islamic ideologue, Sayyid Abu’l-
A’la Mawdudi; and the Tawhid, which refers to a number of different groups and 
networks which broadly adhered to both Salafi and Wahhabi ideology.xxvi  
 
Considering Islam in Sri Lanka to have become infiltrated and corrupted by Buddhist, 
Christian and Hindu religious thinking and practices, the religious movements made it 
their aim to establish ‘true’ Islam by differentiating and at times denigrating the 
religious other. Arab scholars were invited to clarify this position and a range of 
8 
 
literature and online resources were circulated explaining ‘true Islam’ as it was 
practiced in 7th century Arabia.  
 
An important dimension of this religious reform process was a hard-line purification 
project, led by the Tawhid groups, based on Wahhabi/Salafi ideology, calling for the 
removal of shirk and bid’a (polytheism and innovations) from Muslim religious, 
cultural and social practices.xxvii This first phase had two inter-connected but separate 
components; borrowing from Bayat, I found it was a ‘condition’ as well as a ‘project,’ 
the Tawhid pioneering the latter.xxviii 
 
The purification project mainly targeted the four big Sufi Tariqas in Sri Lanka: 
Naqshabandi, Shadhilli, Qadiriyya and Rifaya and other spiritual or mystical leaders, 
known as mowlanas or bawas who while,  not necessarily united, had hegemonically 
defined and determined Muslim religious, cultural and social practices.xxix The 
purification project began scrutinising and demanding the removal of many common 
practices: recitation of Mawlids, prayers venerating the birth and life of Prophet 
Muhammad, was deemed shirk because aspects of the text made divine associations to 
him or to Sufi saints; as was praying at the tombs of saints, many of which existed 
inside mosques. Aspects of Muslim weddings, funerals and coming of age celebrations 
were said to be innovations as they were not practiced by Muhammad and his followers 
in the same way. As part of the process, Mawlids and other religious texts were 
translated into local languages and deemed ‘sinful’ and in contradiction to ‘true Islam.’ 
 
The third dimension of what constituted a trinity of sin, was kufr, denying or rejecting the 
existence of Allah. A kafir, or person who commits kufr, was a term commonly associated 
with non-Muslim, with the exception of when some Tawhid members used it to attack 
Sufis on the grounds they, by committing shirk and bid’a, were rejecting Allah’s orders 
and were therefore kafir. Haniffa, through analysis of the bayans of a ‘piety movement,’ 
Al Muslimaat, shows how Islamic identity is separated from the 'non-Muslim other', 
which she argues is a consequence of Muslims being caught between the increasingly 
nationalistic positions of Sinhalese and Tamils.xxx I found that purity of identity was 
insufficient, religion itself had to be cleansed. Whilst a Muslim was fundamentally 
identified in opposition to a kafir, who was seen to be misguided, ignorant and sinful, the 
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religious movements were less preoccupied with the external other than the internal other, 
which had to be reformed or removed, emphasising a level of superiority and exclusivity 
of the group.  
Caroline and Philippo Osella, in similar research in Kerala, India, strongly criticise the 
scholarly tendency of creating dichotomies of traditional, or Sufi, with ‘reformist’ groups 
and exaggerating tensions amongst these groups whilst presenting them as something 
new.xxxi Although not necessarily articulated in terms of such group dynamics, the binary 
typology of Islam was prevalent amongst Muslims in Sri Lanka and was not limited as 
the Osellas would argue, to political elements.xxxii  These were not fixed categories: both 
'new' and 'old' Islam were evolving and contested, the religious landscape was 
multifaceted, complex and dynamic, with tensions over defining what constituted ‘true 
Islam’ dividing  neighbourhoods and families, sometimes due to which mosque they 
attended or what prayers they felt should be conducted at a funeral. 
At times these tensions led to violence. The most serious incidents were between 
December 2006 and February 2007 in Kattankudy, and involved shooting and damaging 
a mosque, burning religious texts, and desecrating the burial site of a prominent local Sufi 
leader.xxxiii Hasbullah and Korf refer to Kattankudy’s unique enclave geography, claiming 
it ‘inspired a politics of purification and cohabitation,’ particularly as a consequence of 
the brutal LTTE attacks it faced in 1990, resulting in politics and religion converging to 
find order within, initially through ‘radical action against the internal enemy.’ xxxivThis 
was not limited to the confines of a geographical enclave such as Kattankudy, but was in 
fact, perhaps with less extremity, noticeable everywhere I conducted field research 
prompting me at the time to conclude that Muslims were engaging in their own form of 
separatism. Affected by the armed conflict, yet not considered party to it, and unable to 
comfortably place themselves within a contested nation, Muslims commenced their own 
separatist struggle to differentiate and separate from the ethnic other. However, whilst 
doing this they found it difficult to differentiate between self and the ethnic and religious 
other, hence an internal purification process began. Purification which Spencer alludes to 
as ‘same people in the same place’ is not unique to Muslims as other groups have engaged 
in ethnic purification processes; an example being the LTTE expulsion of Muslims from 
the north.xxxv This process however, was non-territorial and whilst it was linked to a sense 
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of an imagined community, the larger Muslim ummah, it was rooted in the country’s 
conflict context. 
 
From migrant workers to transnational Islam: factors contributing to the first phase 
of changes 
A complex constellation of political, religious, social and economic factors contributed 
to the changes experienced by Muslims. The large numbers of Muslims going to the 
Middle East to work, exposed there to a different, unfamiliar, version of Islam, produced 
the preliminary transformation upon their return. Women domestic workers especially 
contributed to the shift in dress code. My research found that some Arab states, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait in particular, were involved in indoctrination programmes aimed at 
male foreign workers. Interviewees explained how the ‘camps’ they lived in were 
regularly visited by preachers often from their own country, who spoke the local language 
and conducted sermons to explain ‘true Islam.’ Scholarships were also awarded to 
mowlavis to pursue their religious learning in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and in all research 
destinations I was by met by several ‘Madanis’ or ‘Riyadhis,’ in reference to the Islamic 
institution they attended. The new mosques and religious institutions were receiving Arab 
funding and much of this was associated with the propagation of particular Islamic 
theories.xxxvi  
The economic and social development of the Muslim community, including higher 
education levels, especially amongst women, resulted in a new professional class who 
found the rationalist, modern, literal interpretations of Islam attractive, and the space for 
debate and discussion of what constituted ‘true Islam’ engaging. With greater internet 
access and increased travel they became part of transnational Islam.xxxvii The overly 
ritualistic and somewhat mystically oriented Sufi groups were unable to reposition 
themselves to appeal to the recently educated Muslim population, who were also traveling 
for work and pilgrimage to Arab and other countries where some of this new thinking was 
validated. 
Each of the religious movements played their part in driving the changes. The Tablighi 
jama’at, by far the largest, most popular and powerful group in Sri Lanka, increased 
mosque attendance through quiet missionary work. They avoided controversy and debate 
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on what constitutes true Islam, but many of them in private appeared to shun shirk and 
bid’a practices, though refusing to impose this position on others. The Jama'at-i Islami, 
with their ideology of Islam encompassing all areas of life, spearheaded some of the 
changes, particularly by introducing economic and social systems in line with Islam. They 
were at the forefront of debates and discussions on Sharia compliance and living an 
‘Islamic life.’ Many of their members subscribed to the larger discourse of identifying 
with and purifying Islam, but while they were publicly working on the former, they did 
not campaign for the latter. The Tawhid groups were the most controversial, operating in 
microcosms across the country; their members acted as lay preachers and activists 
aggressively advocating for change and, when necessary, physically establishing it. They 
bore no qualms about their approach asserting; 'If I speak softly you will not hear what I 
am saying but if I am loud, you will,' and 'Only the Tawhid movement was not afraid to 
stand up against what was wrong.' The Tawhid were seen by some other groups, Sufi ones 
in particular, as ‘extreme,’ ‘radical’ and ‘fundamentalist.’ 
As fighting intensified during the end of the armed conflict between 2007-2009, I found 
most Muslims less engaged with the conflict and instead heavily preoccupied discussing 
and defining ‘true Islam’. The reform process at the time was widespread, intense and 
appeared to be established. 
 
End of the armed conflict and the rise of Buddhist violent extremism 
After the war ended in 2009, Muslims became targets of religious violence and hate 
campaigns. In the early stages incidents typically involved mob and arson attacks on 
religious shrines and places of worship complemented by well organised anti-Muslim 
social media campaigns. These were built on the core claim that Muslims, through 
population growth, religious conversions and economic development, were planning to 
take over Sri Lanka.xxxviii Muslim business establishments were targeted for attack as were 
religious centres and mosques, the former on the basis that they were dominating the 
economy and the latter because of their association to Islam, and occasionally on claims 
of being involved in religious conversion.xxxix The violence peaked in June 2014, when 
three people were killed, 78 people injured and scores of Muslim homes and business 
establishments were destroyed in three-days of mob attacks in the southern town of 
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Aluthgama.xl Between 2015-2017, after a change in government, such incidents of 
violence receded though Islamaphobic social media campaigns continued. The period of 
respite for Muslims was short lived, attacks restarted in 2017 and in February 2018 the 
government had to declare a state of emergency and impose a curfew after the worst 
outbreak of mob and arson attacks since 1980s started in the hill capital Kandy and spread 
to other towns over a period of three days.xli  
The Muslim leadership’s response 
The Muslim response to these events has mainly been framed by scholars through an 
analysis of the community’s historical relations with Buddhists, their contentious identity 
construction and mitigating politics and Buddhist majoritarian ideologies.xlii Haniffa 
discusses how Muslims who had always portrayed themselves as the peaceful community 
that did not take up arms against the state, was in crisis, unable to fully fathom the 
Buddhist rage and subsequent violence.xliii  When it became evident that the violence 
against Muslims was organised, systematic and enjoyed a level of state support, Muslim 
religious and community leaders converged and in an unified response condemned the 
incidents, calling on the government to protect Muslims and drawing international 
attention to the violations they faced. However, in private, they engaged in a process of 
introspection and generally concluded that Muslims had breached the ‘boundaries’ of 
minority status and some of their activities had provoked the Buddhist response. As one 
community leader explained ‘we were a minority behaving like a majority.’ Muslim 
leaders concluded that in identifying strictly with Islam they had firstly compromised on 
their national identity, and secondly externalised it too much, making themselves 
vulnerable and earning the wrath of Buddhists.xliv Community leaders thus began 
advocating for another process of reform, this time it was to re-identify as an ethnic group, 
as Muslims, who had a well-established history in Sri Lanka and have made a significant 
contribution to the state. This identity does not undermine religion, but it is not expected 
to be the only marker and more importantly is not meant to be excessively visible. The 
second aspect of this change was to reduce visibility of Islam in the public space, for 
instance by reducing some symbols like Arabic name boards, and limiting practices such 
as multiple calls for prayers amplified from mosques in close proximity. Thirdly, 
suppressing the ‘purification’ project. The zealous emphasis on removing practices that 
were associated with the ethnic/religious ‘other’ appears to be fading as the Muslim 
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national leadership recognise that this position had caused damaging divisions within the 
community and because it validated Buddhist extremist claims of Muslims’ exclusivity, 
which did not auger well for reconciliation. Similarly, heightened debates and discussions 
on what constituted ‘true Islam’ and what was shirk and bid’a have evolved into 
conversations on accommodating the religious and ethnic other.  
Islam remains omnipresent in this process too, and as in the previous one it is all 
encompassing, but in this instance, given a new image. The re-branding of Islam, a critical 
aspect of the latest reform, has two features; one is to assert its integral closeness to Sri 
Lanka and the second is to portray it as inclusive and peaceful. The second is especially 
significant because it stands in contrast with militant Buddhism and ironically replaces 
Buddhism’s reputation of being a religion of peace. In order to achieve the first, Buddhist 
political and religious leaders are invited to Muslim events and encouraged to speak about 
Muslim contributions to Sri Lankan state-building, which are then extensively publicised 
in mainstream and social media. This contrasts with previous events where foreign 
Islamic scholars were invited to speak about the exceptionality of Islam. 
In a post-conflict context where peacebuilding between the previously warring factions, 
Sinhalese and Tamils, is stalling, Muslim religious and community leaders have begun to 
spearhead reconciliation activities. Some mosques are open to non-Muslims, Buddhist 
monks are invited to Islamic events and Muslim community and religious leaders partake 
in Buddhist communal and religious activities, which previously could have been akin to 
shirk.  
Resultantly Muslim religious leaders have reassessed their relationship with the Kafir and 
Mushrik, softening the barriers they had put up and opening up to the religious other at 
various different levels. By inviting Buddhist monks to Muslim events and listening to 
them speak the words of Buddha, Muslims are exposing themselves to the very ideologies 
that they had warned people to protect themselves from. In examples cited in interviews, 
Muslim community leaders talked of cleaning up Buddhist temples after natural disasters 
as goodwill gestures, which included restoring idols in the knowledge that they will be 
used for worship. Whilst there is clearly a distinction between this and the Tawhid 
categorisation of shirk, where Muslims were accused of venerating or worshiping 
symbols and idols as part of Islam, it nonetheless symbolises a significant shift in Islamic 
interpretations of the external and internal ‘other’. The purification project attempted to 
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identify and remove any practice which had even the remotest resemblance or association 
to the religious other and condemned, discredited and ostracised individuals or groups 
that engaged in such practices. This onslaught, particularly against Sufi groups, appears 
to have reduced.  
Conspicuous in the first phase of Islamic reform was the fraying of religious authority 
which was partly delegitimised because of its association with ‘traditional’ Islam and the 
nature of the Tawhid movement which proliferated new learned religious leaders. Whilst 
the main theological body, the All Ceylon Jamiathul Ulamma (ACJU), was active and 
each of the religious movements had its own hierarchy of leaders, they were dwarfed by 
the level of engagement and activity of the lay preachers.  
In the post-war context, the ACJU have placed themselves in central command of 
religious authority, forcing the different religious movements to come together and 
imposing strict control on religious content circulating through publications and sermons. 
High ranking Islamic leaders have realised that internal friction made them vulnerable to 
Buddhist extremist attacks and through a process of inclusive negotiations, leaders of 
various Islamic movements have been brought to work together. xlv 
There has also been a reconfiguration of Muslim community leadership; Islamic 
movements which previously claimed civil society space have made way for lawyers and 
community leaders, centralised by an umbrella body known as the Muslim Council of Sri 
Lanka (MCSL). The MCSL and ACJU formed the core of the Muslim leadership, 
managing information flow, negotiating at the local and national levels with political and 
security figures and intervening at international forums to draw attention to the 
discrimination faced by Muslims. Their interventions have not all been successful, the 
most prominent example being the ACJU, under pressure from the BBS, conceding to 
handing over their authority on halal certification to an independent body.xlvi Despite this 
the MCSL and ACJU leadership had influence, especially in contrast to the political 
leadership. The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the All Ceylon Makkal Congress, both 
in government, were unable to exert much influence and at the time of the violence 
seemed incapacitated.xlvii  
Fraying of Tawhid as a movement and the need for a national level agenda 
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As with the previous phase, here too there were a number of factors that contributed to 
these changes beyond the obvious external threat. One of the main features was the 
internal fissures and subsequent collapse of the Tawhid as a movement. The groups, in 
some instances unable to agree on minute theological details, had broken away and were 
largely divided. They had also been tainted by claims of being driven by  Saudi Arabian 
or other Middle Eastern agendas rather than purely on Islamic reform. With the securitised 
narratives of Islamic extremism developing in the post-war scenario, promoted in part by 
Buddhist extremist groups and additionally in line with global events, many of these 
groups slowly lost their appeal amongst the larger Muslim population. With the exception 
of the SLTJ and NTJ, the others that have remained under the Tawhid banner have been 
able to show a level of adaptability, at least among their leadership.  In some sense it is 
arguable that much of the work of the Tawhid movement has successfully been 
implemented, leaving little demand for their work and, in the new climate, little appetite 
for their aggression and divisiveness. Many Muslims, though not all, have moved away 
from practicing mawlids, kandhuris and other features of ‘traditional Islam;’ Sufi groups 
remain alive and active though not necessarily increasing in popularity.  
Despite their powerful position, the religious movements were ill-equipped to deal with 
the extremity and enormity of the violence against Muslims. Through their networks they 
were able to provide relief supplies and use mosques for protection but the scale required 
a national response that they were too divided to meet. State culpability in the events, 
through impunity for perpetrators and failing to offer protection to victims, underscored 
the need for a united national response which the ACJU and SLMC rose to. 
This systematic and organised religious position taken by Muslim leaders came into 
serious question after the 2019 Easter Sunday bombers were found to be Sri Lankan 
Muslims with links to ISIS. The NTJ, one of the groups involved in the bombings, was a 
breakaway fraction of the (SLTJ. Very little is known about the second group, the JMI, 
and at the time of publication details on the association of both these groups with ISIS 
remains sketchy. What is known is that the NTJ leader, Zaharan Hashim, had begun 
preaching violent extremism, including suggesting the targeting of non-Muslims for 
attack, as early as 2014, which Muslim leaders nationally and in his hometown 
Kattankuddy had protested against and reported to the police. According to security 
officials Hashim has a following of about 200 people, with some 100 already under 
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arrest.xlviii Community and religious leaders maintain that Hashim and his following are 
part of a fringe group, disassociated from the larger community, radicalised in isolation, 
not representative or associated with other Tawhid groups and pursuing transnational 
objectives unrelated to the local context or situation. Whilst the existence of this 
radicalised element of the Tawhid movement needs to be captured in the Islamic 
landscape of Sri Lanka it is a minute element and its presence does not affect the main 
thesis in this article. The response and measures taken by Muslim civil society and 
religious leaders in the aftermath of the bombings, such as calling on mosques not to 
conduct burial prayers for the bombers, jointly condemning and disassociating 
themselves from the NTJ, using mosques as spaces for protest and to show solidarity with 
Christians, and not objecting to the government’s ban on the face veil for Muslim women 
validates arguments made here about the accommodating religious positioning of the 
Muslim religious and civil society leadership.xlix 
 
Conceptual challenges posed by the Sri Lankan case 
The changes that Muslims experienced in the 1990s problematize conceptual definitions 
and descriptions in the literature of Islamic reform, which are often derived from Islamic 
states or Muslim majority contexts. This shift towards Islam cannot be described as a 
‘revival’ or ‘resurgence’, which would suggest bringing to life something that pre-existed 
but was not the case in Sri Lanka. The changes represented identification and 
demonstration of specific interpretations of Islam. This is arguably a political act, as was 
the competition between the main Islamic movements, however based on the existing 
literature on this subject the changes explained in this article cannot be described as 
‘political Islam’, ‘Islamism,’ or ‘Islamisation,’ which are generally associated with 
politics of the state or as a threat to the state.l Religious identity was a critical element, 
there was indeed some self- fashioning,li but religious thinking and practice were more at 
stake. Osella and Osella’s definition of ‘reformism’ acknowledges the historical and 
modern aspects of the term and differentiates between more problematic labels such as 
‘fundamentalist’ or ‘radicalist’, but in the Sri Lankan context this definition fits only the 
Tawhid groups, excluding the Tablighi Jama’at and Jama’at-i Islam, which are also 
reformist though very different in ideology and approach. In Sri Lanka, the first process 
of change called for a return to the fundamentals of Islam, but the critique of 
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westernisation, secularism and modernisation often associated with definitions of Islamic 
fundamentalism were not dominant,lii with no ‘de-territorialisation’ or ‘de-culturisation,’ 
‘neo-fundamentalism’ was equally inappropriateliii as was ‘post Islamism.’liv The dual 
character as a process and ‘a project’; the larger shift towards Islam promoted by all 
religious movements and the firmer articulation of the Wahhabi influenced, Tawheed 
purification project, layered the reform process in ways that existing conceptualisations 
appear too simplistic to capture. The changes had facets of ‘piety;’lv ‘politics,’lvi 
‘identity,’lvii ‘radicalism’lviii and ‘reformism’lix and they were concerned with defining, 
understanding and practicing Islam.  
Islamic change can also be portrayed in the literature as novel, modern and exceptional 
but as Robinson argues they can be rooted in historical projects and processes.lx Identity 
construction in the 19th century, Tamil militant attacks on Muslims, and the SLMC’s 
attempts at political Islam all contributed to shaping the nature of the reforms, linking it 
with Arab Islam and culture and demeaning the Indian and Tamil influence, identifying 
with a ‘global ummah’ and absolutist positioning of aspiring towards one, ‘true’ Islam. 
Muslims have faced violence and persecution when their economic and religious position 
has been interpreted as a threat by the dominant group, as was the case in the early 
colonial period, pre-independence during the infamous 1915 Buddhist-Muslim violence 
and in the present context. The latest response by Muslims to integrate with Buddhists 
bears some resemblance to what their ancestors did when, in peril, they migrated to the 
Kandyan Kingdom in the 17th century; as does the present rebranding of Islam to Muslim 
political elites’ claims during the 19th century of historical links between Islam and Sri 
Lanka.lxi The influence of transnational Islam, globalisation, Wahhabism and Muslim 
geo-politics in the post-war context make the current Muslim religious position different, 
yet not without precedent. It is evidently fluid and evolving. Binary evaluations of 
transnational versus local Islam also do not hold firm in the Sri Lankan case because the 
first phase, though influenced by global factors, had a very particular ‘local,’ conflict 
dimension, and the latter phase, through apparently seeking a Sri Lankan Islam, is not 
void of international campaigns on minority rights and freedom of religion for Muslims. 
Mahmood urges scholars to take up “the opportunity to explore the structurally precarious 
position that minorities (religious, racial, and ethnic) have come to occupy in all modern 
societies, and how the modern state produces and conditions their precarity.” Clearly, the 
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modern Sri Lankan state, in its Sinhala nationalist embodiment and majoritarian ideology, 
has dictated when ethnicity as opposed to religion dominates, and thereby produced and 
reproduced minority categorisations. The second largest ethnic group, Tamils, have 
preferred to identify themselves as a nation rather than a minority, which was not accepted 
by the state and partly led to the armed conflict. Muslims on the other hand, and as this 
article demonstrates, shifted their identity and religion to respond to the state and to ethno-
nationalisms. In this Sri Lankan Muslim case, the minority categorisation was a colonial 
construct which preceded the modern state, though arguably existed in anticipation of it, 
but most importantly was a response to growing ethno-nationalism. It therefore, illustrates 
how minority identity, politics, and as I highlight, religion, are produced and reproduced 
by complex constellations of ethnicity, conflict, nationalisms, transnationalism, for which 
the modern state may or may not be responsible.  
 
Conclusion 
 During the armed conflict Muslims were made to feel inconsequential at the 
highest level by not being considered a party to the conflict and by being insufficiently 
protected by the state from militant attacks. This led to a process of identity and religious 
construction marked through separatism; removing kafir influence which existed in the 
community in religious, social and cultural practices in the form of shirk and bid’a. Whilst 
the Quran, sharia and hadith were quoted extensively to define ‘true Islam’ Tawhid 
adherents also critiqued these practices on the grounds that they were from other religions 
and cultures. This separation did not, however, resemble a quietist piety movement, 
rather, by externalising it Muslims wanted to emphasise to the other their different 
identity and religious exceptionalism. They used religion to be on par with the others in 
Sri Lanka’s competitive and conflicting ethno/religious/national landscape.   
In the aftermath of the war this threatened the new Buddhist ‘victors’ who wanted to enjoy 
unchallenged majoritarianism. Muslims could have responded with violence, considered 
militancy or at the least held on to their positions on the grounds of religious freedom, 
but they instead responded through reform. The state’s association with violent Buddhism 
and its brutal crushing of Tamil militancy would have been critical considerations. It is 
also arguable that Muslims, facing an existential threat, were left with no choice but to 
interpret minority status as being submissive to the majority and subservient to their 
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dominance. This however, would be too simplistic a conclusion. Muslims have a long 
history of co-existence and they have always sought to be accepted and part of the national 
fabric. Arguably, even amidst the hate and violence, Muslims recognised that through 
adaptation they would have an opportunity to participate as equals  in post-war nation 
building. They saw an opportunity in the threat that fed their long-held desire for inclusion 
and acceptance by the dominant other. Once again, their minority status determined their 
religious identity, norms and practice, underscoring its importance to the study of identity 
politics and religion. 
As the latest venue of ISIS carnage, understanding the Islamic terrain in Sri Lanka 
provides broader analysis of how religion, identity, conflict merge in reform and even 
radicalisation processes. The Western and Christian targets of the NTJ and ISIS attacks 
reveal how the activities of the violent extremist group were disconnected and unrelated 
to the larger threat faced from Buddhist extremists. However, that this element of 
radicalisation was cultivated in an environment mainly focused on non-violence and 
peace building shows how the transnational dimension can co-exist even if marginal and 
incongruous to the local political reality. The awareness of the existence of this radical 
element has shocked Muslims, left them in disarray and brought to the surface religious 
ideological fissures identified in the first phase of change. The events have also 
exacerbated Muslims’ vulnerability to reprisal attacks, hate campaigns and violence. This 
article has argued that even amidst the influence of Islam, religious change amongst 
Muslims has been determined fundamentally in relation to the ethnic and religious other. 
As Sri Lanka’s conflict trajectory enters new grounds with Muslims at the centre, Islam 
and Muslim identity are likely to face new levels of scrutiny, challenge and much 
uncertainty. 
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This article was ready for publication when the Easter Sunday bombings took place in 
Sri Lanka. The author has attempted to update it through minor revisions, but at the time 
of going to press details of the events remain scarce. 
Notes 
i Though these were not clearly identifiable phases with respect to time frames and were 
indeed not the first and second time they were witnessed in Sri Lanka, for the purpose of this 
article I will henceforth refer to them as the first phase (during the armed conflict) and second 
phase (post-armed conflict). 
ii Osella and Osella, “Introduction: Islamic reformism,” i and Soares and Osella, Islam, 
politics, anthropology, i. 
iii Mahmood, Religious difference, 25 and Wickramasinge, Sri Lanka in a modern age, 48. 
iv Department of Census and Statistics, 2012 Census. The Sinhalese population amounted to 
74%, Tamil population was at 15.3 percent, Muslims numbered 9.3. The following is the 
population breakdown according to religion: Buddhists amounted to 70.1 percent, all of who 
are Sinhalese in ethnicity; Hindus were at 12.6 percent, Tamil in ethnicity; 9.7 percent of the 
population identified with practicing Islam and 7.6 were Christians, Sinhalese, Tamil and 
Burgher in ethnicity. 
v The reference to ‘Muslims,’ ‘the community,’ ‘the group’ does not suggest they are 
homogeneous and is with acknowledgement to the difference and diversity which the article 
itself highlights. There are also sub groups amongst the Muslims such as Malays, Bohras and 
Memons. 
vi Bartholomeusz, In defence of dharma. 
vii UN OHCHR, UN OHCHR Investigation, ii and 6. 
viii  Minority Rights Group, No war no peace, 5 and Jayawickreme et al, “Triumphalism, fear 
and humiliation,” 208. 
ix Holt, Buddhist extremists and Muslim, introduction.  
x Haniffa, “Piety and politics;” Mc Gilvray and Raheem, “Muslim perspectives” and Nuhman, 
Muslims in Sri Lanka. 
xi This article is based on several rounds of field research in Sri Lanka. The first phase of 
research was conducted in 2007, in four areas: Dharga town, Kattankudy, Mawanella and 
Colombo, and was part ethnographic and qualitative. Between 2007-2010, I conducted more 
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qualitative interviews during research trips to Colombo. This phase of research fed into my 
PhD; completed in 2016. A second phase of field research took place in 2016-2017 when I 
conducted qualitative interviews with religious and civil society leaders in Colombo, Dharga 
town and Kattankudy. 
xii The Guardian, “Pressure builds on Sri Lankan.”  
xiii The Guardian, “Sri Lanka police” and phone interviews with Sri Lankan Muslim community 
leaders. 
xiv Shanmugaratnam and Zackariya, “Communialisation of Muslims,” and Ismail, “Unmooring 
identity.” 
xv Ali, “Sri Lankan Muslims;” Haniffa, “Piety and politics;” Mc Gilvray and Raheem, “Muslim 
perspectives” and Nuhman, Muslims in Sri Lanka. 
xvi Deveraja, Muslims of Sri Lanka. 
xvii Mc Gilvray and Raheem, “Muslim perspectives” and Nuhman, Muslims in Sri Lanka. 
xviii Mihlar, Coming out of the margins, 11. 
xix ICG, Sri Lanka’s Muslims, 7. In October, 1990, the LTTE forcibly evicted the entire 
Muslim population from the northern province in 24 hours- 3 days. 
xx  Mc Gilvray and Raheem, “Muslim perspectives;” Knoerzer, “Transformation of Muslim 
political identity” and Johansson, Pragmatic Muslim politics 
xxi Mihlar, The pursuit of piety, 105.  
xxii Muslims not considered as a party to the conflict were thereby not included in the 
Norwegian facilitated peace negotiation (2001-2006). In 2002, the Norwegians organised one 
meeting with the head of the SLMC, Rauf Hakeem, and the LTTE leader, Velupillai 
Prabhakaran in 2002, as part of their attempts to keep Muslims involved in the process. They 
also set up the Muslim Peace Secretariat to research and report on conflict related violations 
suffered by Muslims. 
xxiii Haniffa, “Under cover” and Mihlar, The pursuit of piety. 
xxiv The Tablighi Jama’at was founded, in Mehwat, India, by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas 
Kandhlawi (1885-1944). It is believed to have started in Sri Lanka in the early 1950s. For a 
good introduction to the movement see; Metcalf, 'Traditionalist' Islamic activism. 
xxv The Jama’at-i-Islami, was founded in 1941 in India and was started in 1954 in Sri Lanka. 
Irfan Ahamed’s work provides a sound introduction to the Jama’at-i-Islami, see; Ahmad, 
“Genealogy of the Islamic state.” 
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xxvi The movement’s origins can be traced to Abdul Hameed Bakri who founded the 
Jamiyyathu Ansaris Sunnathul Mohammatiyya (JASM) in 1947 in a small town called 
Paragahadeniya, in the Kurunegala district, in north central Sri Lanka. Some of the groups and 
individuals would say their ideology has Salafi influences, but few would acknowledge the 
Wahhabi links as the latter was seen as derogatory.  
xxvii Commins, The Wahhabi mission and Haykel, On the nature of Salafi thought. 
xxviii Bayat, Post Islamism.  
xxix McGilvray, “Sri Lankan Muslims.”. 
xxx Haniffa, “Piety and Politics.” 
xxxi Osella and Osella, “Islamic Reformism,” 252 and 255. 
xxxii Osellas and Osella, “Islamic Reformism,” 252. 
xxxiii Hasbullah and Korf, “Muslim Geographies” and Klem, “Islam and Muslim politics.” 
xxxivHasbullah and Korf, “Muslim Geographies.” 
 xxxv Spencer, “A nation living in,” 3 and Klem, “Islam and Muslim politics”  
xxxvi Mowlavi and Mowlavia refer to those who qualify from the local madrasa system, they 
usually take on roles of religious pedagogy and preaching in mosques. Madhani and Riyadhi, 
refer to those who qualified from the University of Madina and Riyadh, in Saudi Arabia. 
xxxvii Eickelman and Anderson, New media in the Muslim world. 
xxxviii Nuhman, “Sinhala Buddhist nationalism,” and Mihlar, “Coming out of the margins.” 
xxxix Imtiaz and Saleem, “Muslims in post war Sri Lanka.” Based on allegations that Muslim 
business establishments were planting fertility hampering drugs in women’s undergarments 
and in food products, a boycott was called of Muslim shops and several, including the well-
established clothing chain, Fashion Bug, were attacked and set fire to.  
xl Nuhman, “Sinhala Buddhist nationalism,” and Mihlar, Coming out of the margins. 
 xli Ibid.  
xlii Holt, Buddhist extremists and Muslim minorities: Imtiyaz and Saleem, “Muslims in post-
war Sri Lanka” and Nuhman, “Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.” 
xliii Haniffa, “Stories in the aftermath of Aluthgama.” 
xliv They cited examples of numerous calls for prayers amplified from mosques in the same 
village, excessive emphasis on halal products, including not paying sufficient attention to 
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Buddhist sensitivities during animal sacrifice for the hajj festival. They also noted that they 
had become cut off from the other religious communities and were too ‘self-obsessed.’ 
xlv The deviant group the Sri Lanka Tawhid Jama’at (SLTJ), which continued to hold firm to 
their position were eventually side-lined by the central religious authority. In 2016, police 
arrested the secretary of the SLTJ for engaging in hate speech against Buddhists. The arrest 
took place just days after the BBS leader demanded the arrest of the SLTJ leader raising 
concerns on partiality of the law enforcement authorities.  
xlvi Haniffa, “Conflict legacies.” 
xlvii Rauf Hakeem, of the SLMC, took some vocal stances and reportedly made international 
interventions, but neither the SLMC nor ACMC were able to significantly influence the 
previous government into taking action against violent perpetrators. 
xlviii Guardian, “Sri Lanka police” and phone interviews with Muslim community leaders. 
xlix Phone interviews with Muslim religious and community leaders. 
l Ayoob, The many faces of; Roy, Globalised Islam. 
li Osella and Soares, Islam, politics, anthropology, 7. 
lii Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism; Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism. 
liiiliii Roy and Volk, The failure of political Islam. 
liv Bayat, Post-Islamism. 
 lv Haniffa, “Piety and politics.”  
lvi Spencer et al, Checkpoint, temple, church and mosque. 
lvii Nuhman, Sri Lanka Muslims. 
lviii Choueiri, Islamic fundamentalism. 
lix Osella and Osella, “Islamic Reformism.” 
lx Robinson, “Islamic reform and modernity.” 
lxi When Muslim identity came under threat in the 19th century, I.L.M Abdul Azeez’s 
claimed that Ceylon was attractive to Arabs as the first prophet of Islam, Adam, had set 
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